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,FULL FAITH AND CREDIT OF ADJUDICATION
OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
PAUL E. FARRIER*
E construction and application of the so called Full Faith and
redit Clause of the United States Constitution and its attend-
ng acts of Congress! have resulted in not a little confusion in the
principles involved and the problem has been handled, seemingly, with a
lack of understanding by judicial opinion. The attempt here is to clarify, in
a measure at least, the thought upon the subject with respect to impeach-
ment of judgments of sister states on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant 3 and particularly with reference to con-
tradiction of an adjudication or recital of the existence of that jurisdiction.
At first the cases were somewhat in confusion 4 regarding the effect of a
foreign judgments but it is now recognized that the domestic forum, in a
* Of the Illinois Bar.
I U.S. Const. Art. 4, § i:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
This principle was not new in our history. For history of this Constitutional provision see pa-
per by George P. Costigan Jr. in 4 Col. L. Rev. 470 (1904).
2 Stat. 122 (W790), 28 U.S.C.A. § 687 (1928):
"The said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated shall have such faith and credit
to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of
the state from which they are taken."
See also 2 Stat. 298 (1804), 28 U.S.C.A. § 688 (X928).
3 There may be certain other valid reasons for not according full faith and credit to a judg-
ment of a sister state with which this article is not concerned, such as when the judgment is for
the enforcement of a penalty. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1883); Heston v.
Chicago Nat. City Bank, 28o Fed. 525 (C.A.D.C. 1922).
4 See Armstrong v. Carson's Exr., 2 Dall. (U.S.) 302 (1794), holding that the only issue was
the fact of the judgment and that was to be determined by inspection of the transcript; Green
v. Sarmiento, io Fed. Cas. No. 5,76o (C.C.Pa. i8io); Bigger v. Hutchings, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 445
(1830); Noble v. Gold, I Mass. 410 (iSoS); Bartlet v. Knight, I Mass. 4o (I8O5); Bissell v.
Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1813); Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 333 (1842); Hitchcock v. Aicken,
I Cai. (N.Y.) 460 (i8o3); Hubbell v. Coudrey, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 132 (i8og); Taylor v. Bryden,
8 Johns. (N.Y.) 173 (181i); Pawling v. Wilson, 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 192 (186); Hazard v. Not-
tingham, Tapp. (Ohio) 146 (1817); Betts v. Death, Add. (Pa.) 265 (i795); Flourenoy v. Durke,
4 S.C.L. 256 (i8o8); Glasgow v. Lowther's Admx., Cooke (Tenn.) 464 (1813); Winchester v.
Evans, Cooke (Tenn.) 420 (1813); Lawrence v. Roberts, 2 Overt. (Tenn.) 236 (1814).
s The use of the term "foreign judgment" throughout this discussion is used for the sake of
convenience and unless otherwise specified the term refers to the judgment of a state of the
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suit on a judgment rendered by a sister state, may inquire into the juris-
diction of the sister state to render the judgment in question. If it is found
that the latter did not have jurisdiction to render the judgment, the do-
mestic forum is not compelled to recognize the judgment under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.6 This is of course based upon the principle that
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is invalid and constitutes no
judgment at all. As a matter of fact, it should be noted, the domestic fo-
rum is required by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution' not to rec-
ognize a judgment rendered without such jurisdiction,9 since the enforce-
ment of such a judgment amounts to the taking of property without due
process of law. Thus the inquiry would seem to be merely what consti-
tuted jurisdiction. Certainly, it is at least necessary to have clearly in
mind the concepts of jurisdiction before any further discussion, though no
attempt will be made here to cover the subject exhaustively.
Jurisdiction has from its beginning been based upon the physical power
of the court, 0 and our concepts of the present are still based mainly upon
this principle. Besides personal service, which began with physical custo-
United States other than of the forum and does not include judgments of foreign countries. It
should be noted, however, that the principles underlying the recognition of the latter type of
judgments are the same as those involved in the former with the exception that recognition of
judgments of foreign countries is not mandatory as is the recognition of the judgments of sister
states. Thus if the court rendering the judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so, that judgment
should not be recognized by the courts of this country regardless of whether the judgment is
one of a sister state or one of a foreign country. See: Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. (U.S.)
812 (1869); French Mut. Gen. Soc. v. U.S. Fidelity etc. Co., 2o3 Fed. 558 (D.C. Md. 1913)
(reversedin 212 Fed. 620 (C.C.A. 4th 1914)). But where the judgment is one of a foreign coun-
try it is not necessarily true that it will be recognized even though the court had jurisdiction to
render the judgment. See: Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (i895).
6 The holdings on this point are too numerous to set forth in detail. See 32 L.R.A. (N.S.)
905, 909 (i9ii).
7The courts of the United States follow the principles set forth in Lord Blackburn's opinion
in Godard v. Gray, L.R. 6 Q.B. 139, 148 (1870)
...... it seems to follow that anything which negatives the existence of that obligation
(created by the foreign judgment) or excuses the defendant from performance of it must form
a good defense to the action."
8 U.S. Const. Amendm. V. and Amendm. XIV § x.
9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Sprately, 172
U.S. 602 (1899); Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8(i9o7); Wetmore v. Karrick,
205 U.S. 141 (i9o7); Riverside etc. Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. i89 (9ig5), Bryant v.
Shulte's Exr., 147 Ky. 268, 144 S.W. 28 (1912); Central Pa. Conference Ed. Soc. v. La Rue,
162 Mo. App. 93, X48 S.W. 152 (1912).
10 "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power" Holmes. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90 (1917).
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dy," as a basis for jurisdiction to render a personal judgment 2 it is con-
ceded that jurisdiction exists if the defendant consents to be sued.' There
was no need to send the sheriff after some one if he came voluntarily or
consented to be bound by what took place in his absence. It is further ad-
mitted generally14 that the domicil of the defendant within the jurisdiction
is a good basis for jurisdiction.5 Presumably the sheriff could always
reach one who was domiciled within the jurisdiction and if absent or in
hiding there was all the more reason as a matter of convenience and neces-
sity to allow a personal judgment based upon such jurisdiction. It has
also been contended that jurisdiction might be based upon citizenship
since a sovereign naturally has control over its subjects. 6 Until recently' 7
this has been the extent of the various grounds of jurisdiction, though now
the doing of certain acts within the state is recognized as giving the court
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment, at least if connected with such
acts. 8
i Holdsworth, History of English Law (i931), 210; Collins v. Page, Styles Reports 124
(z649). For a parallel in Roman law see the first two paragraphs of the first of the Roman
Tables (45o B.C.). The writs of attachment and distringas, capias, outlawry and the statute
of 9 and io William I were all designed to secure custody of the defendant. Finally the statute
of 12 George I, c. 29 was passed in 1725 out of which the modem method of taking judgment
upon default arose.
This discussion is limited to the question of giving full faith and credit to personal judg-
ments. It is suggested, however, that the principles stated herein are applicable to other judg-
ments upon the application of other jurisdictional factors.
13 The most common case of jurisdiction by consent is when the defendant makes a general
appearance in an action against him in which he has not been served with process. See: Hill
v. Mendenhall, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 453 (x874); Interior Constr. etc. Co. v. Gibney, i6o U.S. 217
(1895); Western Loan etc. Co. v. Butte etc. Minn. Co., 210 U.S. 368 (i9o8). As to non-residents
see Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (U.S.) 253 (i855).
X4 The contrary has been held in some cases. See: De La Montanya v. De La Montanya,
112 Cal. ioi, 44 Pac. 345 (1896), and Raher v. Raher, i5o Ia. 51i, 129 N.W. 494 (i9i).
xs See: Schlawig v. De Peyster, 83 Ia. 323, 49 N.W. 843 (i8gi); Henderson v. Staniford, 105
Mass. 504 (z870); Pinney v. Providence Loan & Inv. Co., io6 Wis. 396, 82 N.W. 308 (r9oo);
Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.), § 649.
16 Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N.W. 477 (1887). However, since it is doubtful whether
one is a citizen of a State of the United States, see Hammerstein v. Lyne, 2oo Fed. i65 (D.C.
Mo. 1912), the significance of this basis of jurisdiction in the present discussion is unimportant;
Ouseley v. Lehigh Valley Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 84 Fed. 602 (C. C. Pa. 1897); Grubel v.
Nassauer, 21o N.Y. 149, 1o3 N.E. 1113 (1913), noted in 27 Harv. L. Rev. 464 (1914).
17 It was not until the middle of the i9th century that it became generally recognized that a
personal judgment could be recovered against a foreign corporation. See The Lafayette Insur-
ance Co. v. French, i8 How. (U.S.) 404 (i8S55); Peckham v. North Parish in Haverhill, 16
Pick. (Mass.) 274 (1834); McQueen v. Middietown Manufacturing Co., .6 Johns. (N.Y.) 5
(i8ig).
18 See: Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law
(i9i8), c. 5; Cahill, jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 676 (1917);
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It should be pointed out that there are two types of jurisdictional facts.
One speaks of domicil, personal service, doing business etc. as being juris-
dictional facts but behind each of these jurisdictional facts there are other
facts the existence of which make as a matter of law for the existence of
what is called the jurisdictional fact. Thus in domicil there are certain
facts which must be true before it can be said that the defendant was
domiciled within a given state. In personal service certain other facts are
necessary and so on.
In each case it is necessary for the court to determine four things.
First, that facts A, B, and C are present; second, that such facts, as a
matter of law, constitute the jurisdictional basis under consideration;
third, that because of such jurisdictional basis the court may assume
jurisdiction over the defendant; and fourth, that jurisdiction in such a
manner or upon such a basis is authorized by the law of the state. These
elements are hereinafter referred to as the jurisdictional facts, the jurisdic-
tional basis, the jurisdictional conclusion, and the jurisdictional authori-
zation. It may well be that the jurisdiction necessary to satisfy due
process need not include the fourth element as will appear from the subse-
quent discussion. But these fundamentals underlie any solution to the
question as to when an adjudication or recital of jurisdiction may be
controverted.
Certain situations may be eliminated as not coming within the scope of
the present discussion. The record of a judgment may or may not reflect
the facts upon which the foreign court assumed jurisdiction to render the
judgment. When there are facts recited in the record, and these facts
alone are relied upon to support jurisdiction, and where it is apparent that
they are not sufficient to support such jurisdiction, there is no particular
problem involved since it is apparent from the record that the judgment
is void and not entitled to full faith and credit. 9 Thus in the case of Old
Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871 (i919); Fead, Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1926); Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 270 (1933).
9 Settemier v. Sullivan, 97 U.S. 444 (1878); Pembleton v. Ill. Commercial Men's Assn.,
289 Ill. 99, 124 N.E. 355 (i919), noted in 29 Yale L. J. 567 (r920).
The specific problem of contradiction of a finding of jurisdictional facts does not arise even
where there is an attempt to show that jurisdictional facts other than those recited in the rec-
ord existed. But the problem might seem to arise upon an attempt to show that a jurisdictional
fact existed which is contrary to one recited. Thus the record may disclose that the defendant
was not domiciled within the state and that the defendant was served with substituted serv-
ice. If the record alone were relied upon it is apparent that the court did not have jurisdiction
to render a personal judgment (see: Settlemier v. Sullivan, srupra) and as a consequence the
domestic forum should not recognize the judgment. However, suppose the plaintiff wishes to
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Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. Flyn o the plaintiff declared on a judgment
reciting service upon a certain person not designated by statute nor con-
nected with the defendant. It thus appearing that the attempt to secure
jurisdiction was ineffective, a demurrer to the declaration was sustained.
Similarly, in the case in which the record is silent as to the jurisdictional
facts upon which the judgment is based, the problem under consideration
does not arise. There being no jurisdictional facts appearing from the rec-
ord there can be no contradiction of those facts and whether or not the
court had jurisdiction to render the judgment can only be determined
upon inquiry.21
Where the record recites facts sufficient to give the court jurisdiction,
however, or there has been a prior adjudication of those facts and the de-
fendant seeks to contradict them in the domestic forum in a suit on the
judgment the problem is squarely raised.
THE E CRECT OF A RECITAL OR UNCONTESTED ADJUDICATION
It is generally stated as in the case of Smithman v. Gray," that when a
suit upon a foreign judgment is brought, that judgment may be impeached
for lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court irrespective of the recitals of
jurisdiction contained in the record of judgment.23 The reasons assigned
to this rule were stated in Thompson v. Whitman:24
show that while the record disclosed that the defendant was a non-resident, the latter was in
fact domiciled within the state so that the foreign court was justified in assuming jurisdiction
based upon substituted service. It is apparent that the admission of such evidence, while it may
represent a contradiction of an adjudication or recital of jurisdictional facts, has no place in
the present discussion since if it is so admitted the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judg-
ment is upheld and there is no denial of fuli faith and credit. On the other hand if such evidence
is not admitted there is no contradiction of the recital of jurisdictional fact.
20 31 Ind. App. 473, 68 N.E. 327 (19o3).
" It might be said that in every judgment there is an implied recital of jurisdiction since the
court would not have rendered the judgment if it had not found that jurisdiction existed. See
Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29 (917), "A court that renders
judgment against a defendant thereby tacitly asserts, if it does not do so expressly, that it has
jurisdiction over that defendant."
- 203 Mich. 317, 168 N.W. 998 (i918).
23 Similar statements are found in Banco De Sonora v. Morales, 23 Ariz. 248, 203 Pac. 328
(1922); O'Rourke v. C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 55 Ia. 332,7 N.W. 582 (i88o); Sullivan v. Kenny,
148 Ia. 361, 126 N.W. 349 (igio); Old Wayne Life Assn. v. Flynn, 31 Ind. App. 473, 68 N.E.
327; Marshall v. R. M. Owen and Co., 171 Mich. 232, 137 N.W. 204 (i9r?); Moore v. Williams,
ix Neb. 342, 196 N.W. 695 (1923); Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 13o N.E. 566 (1921);
Rice v. Bennett, 29 S.D. 341, i37 N.W. 359 (1912); Wood v. Augustins, 70 Vt. 637,41 At. 583
(1898); Carpenter v. Ritchie, 2 Wash. St. 512, 28 Pac. 38o (18gi).
24 18 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (873).
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"But if it is once conceded that the validity of a judgment may be attacked collater-
ally by evidence showing that the court had not jurisdiction, it is not perceived how any
allegation contained in the record itself, however strongly made, can affect the right so
to question it. The very object of the evidence is to invalidate the paper as a record. If
that can be successfully done no statements contained therein have any force. If any
such statements could be used to prevent inquiry, a slight form of words might always
be adopted so as effectually to nullify the right of such inquiry."'s
However, prior to this decision the rule in some jurisdictions was to the
contrary2
6
Most of these cases have been overruled by decisions in accord with
Thompson v. Whtitman.
The record may recite that the defendant was personally served within
the state, was domciled within the state, appeared without being served,
consented to the judgment or that the defendant foreign corporation was
doing business in the state, etc. For example, in the case of National Ex-
change Bank v. Wiley 7 the plaintiff recovered a judgment in Ohio upon a
note containing an authorization for any attorney to confess judgment in
favor of the holder of the note. The judgment recited that an attorney
acting by virtue of the warrant entered an appearance for the defendant
and waived process. In a suit on this judgment in a Nebraska court the
defendant contended that since the plaintiff bank had sold the note before
the Ohio judgment was obtained, it was not the holder of the note and as
a consequence the appearance recited was not in accordance with the de-
fendant's authorization and that therefore the Ohio judgment was void.
Such was the finding by the Nebraska court. Upon the question as to
25 S8 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 468 (1873).
26 For example the Illinois Court in the case of Zepp v. Hager, 70 M1. 223 (1873), was of the
opinion that:
"The general doctrine no doubt is where it appears from the record, the court which pro-
nounced the judgment had jurisdiction by service of process or personal appearance of the de-
fendant it will under the Constitution and the Act of Congress be deemed conclusive of the
rights of the parties and no evidence can be heard to impeach it."
Similarly in the case of Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 232 (1828), the court said:
"The full faith and credit required to be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of
other States, will prevent any evidence to contradict the facts which show jurisdiction if such
appear on the record."
See also Semple v. Glenn, gr Ala. 245 (x89I); Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 536 (1843);
Citizens' National Bank v. Consolidated Glass Co., 83 W.Va. i, 97 S.E. 689 (i919); cf. Welch
v. Sykes, 3 Gilm. (Ill.) 197 (1846), holding demurrer to plea that defendant was not a resident
and made no personal appearance nor authorized any appearance should be overruled but that
a demurrer to plea that defendant was not served with process and had no notice of the suit
should be sustained.
27 195 U.S. 257 (1904). See also: Grover and Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137
U.S. 287 (i89o) and Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 8 N.E. 1028 (r9o7).
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whether such a showing was proper the United States Supreme Court was
of the opinion that:
"Proof that the payee bank was not the owner of the note when it brought suit in Ohio
tended to show that it was not in law the 'holder' of the instrument within what must
be regarded as the true meaning of the warrant of attorney, and therefore, that court
was without authority to enter judgment by confession in its favor against the obligor.
In other words, the defendant could show collaterally that he was not legally before
the court, if his appearance was entered and judgment confessed by one who had in
fact, at the time, no authority to do either."28
The court cites Thompson v. Whitman29 in support of its holding.
It will be noted in this case that it was admitted or assumed by both
parties that the Ohio court was authorized to render a judgment based
upon the jurisdictional facts recited in the record; that consent does fur-
nish a valid basis for jurisdiction and that an appearance based upon a
warrant of attorney does constitute consent to jurisdiction. The only
question involved was whether or not the attorney was authorized to
enter the appearance. Thus the attack is directed at the jurisdictional
facts rather than the basis, conclusion or authorization.
The case of Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Assn.3° illustrates an
attack upon the jurisdictional basis. In this case the acts of the defendant
foreign corporation were admitted and it was further admitted that doing
business is a valid jurisdictional basis, but the point contradicted was
whether or not these acts of the defendant amounted to the doing of busi-
ness within the state, i.e. the basis upon which jurisdiction was assumed.
Contrasting these cases with Pennoyer v. Ne#ff3' it will be seen that in the
latter case the attack is upon the jurisdictional conclusion ratther than
upon the jurisdictional facts or basis.
The jurisdiction sought in each of these cases is not jurisdiction as de-
termined by the law of any particular jurisdiction. It is not a question of
the law of the foreign or the domestic forum, but jurisdiction as deter-
mined by those principles fundamental in our system of law. That is,
jurisdiction in the constitutional law sense of due process, since a judg-
ment rendered without such jurisdiction is a violation of due process.32
28 195 U.S. 257, 268 (i9o4).
29 I8 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (1873). A rather unusual case illustrating the principle is that of Rice
v. Bennett, 29 S.D. 341, 137 N.W. 359 (1912), where the defendant in an action on a foreign
judgment was allowed to show that though an attorney employed by the defendant to look
after his interests appeared and waived process such attorney was not specifically authorized by
the defendant to waive process and consequently the foreign court was lacking in jurisdiction.
30 289 Ill. 99, 124 N.E. 355 (1919).
3r 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 32 See cases cited in supra note 9.
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The Supreme Court of the United States is consequently the final author-
ity on such questions of jurisdiction.
It would seem then that a court not only may inquire into a foreign
judgment to see whether or not it is a valid judgment, i.e. rendered with-
out jurisdiction, but that the court must do so. The inquiry is whether
such jurisdiction as stated above exists. This would seem to be so despite
any adjudication or recital with reference to the jurisdictional basis or the
jurisdictional conclusion upon which that judgment is based. Even
though it is apparent that the foreign court determined its own jurisdic-
tion upon what it conceived to be those general principles of our law re-
lating to jurisdiction, the domestic court should not be bound thereby
since the determination of jurisdiction must be in accord with such princi-
ples as have been promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United
States. If the domestic forum decides that it must give full faith and
credit to the foreign court's judgment based upon the latter's determina-
tion of these jurisdictional questions, when, as a matter of fact, according
to the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States
that jurisdiction does not exist, then could-not its decision recognizing the
foreigh judgment be attacked on the grounds of denial of due process?
If it is assumed that the domestic court cannot determine for itself the
jurisdictional questions, the domestic court would seem to be caught in a
dilemma. If it accepts the foreign court's determination it may be re-
versed on the grounds of denial of due process. If it refuses to accept that
determination it may be reversed on the grounds of denial of full faith and
credit. It would seem that upon such a theory no matter what the domes-
tic court did it would be wrong. But if the domestic forum is always
required to determine these jurisdictional questions by its own concept of
the application of those principles, and its application of those principles
is wrong, then if the domestic forum determines erroneously that the for-
eign court did not have jurisdiction as a matter of law, it is not the lack of
the power of the court to inquire into the facts which is the error but the
incorrect interpretation of those facts. This results in a denial of full faith
and credit. The question in the last analysis depends upon the interpreta-
tion of those facts by the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus if the
domestic court erroneously decides that jurisdiction did not exist there is
a denial of full faith and credit. If the court erroneously decides that
jurisdiction did exist then there is a denial of due process. In any event
the court must inquire into the jurisdiction. The mere fact that the for-
eign judgment recites the jurisdictional facts, basis or conclusion, or con-
tains an adjudication with respect thereto can have no bearing upon the
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right, power or duty of the domestic court to determine for itself those
same questions. In such cases the denial of full faith and credit is not in
the refusal of the domestic court to accept the foreign judgment without
questioning its jurisdiction but in the erroneous decision that the foreign
court did not have jurisdiction.
From this discussion it is apparent that the theory of Thompson v.
Whitman3 3 encounters no difficulty so far as the jurisdictional facts, the
jurisdictional basis and the jurisdictional conclusion are concerned.
The remaining question is the effect of the jurisdictional authorization.
It naturally happens that different jurisdictions make different provisions
relative to the rendition of judgments by their courts. These provisions
are, of course, subject to certain minimum requirements necessary to due
process but many impose additional requirements. For example some
states require actual personal service regardless of domicil, while others
consider merely prima fade evidence of personal service plus domicil as a
sufficient basis for a personal judgment. In other words some states
authorize a personal judgment based upon a sheriff's false return by reason
of the rule that the sheriff's return cannot be impeached. 34 In the case of
Miedrich v. Lauenstein35 it was held that such a rule was not a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would natu-
rally seem to follow from this that a judgment based upon a sheriff's false
return was a judgment founded upon good jurisdiction and consequently
must be given faith and credit. Such, however, is contrary to unequivocal
holdings in numerous cases.
36
The consideration under the due process clause is directed specifically
at those underlying principles of jurisdiction contained in what is here re-
ferred to as the jurisdictional basis and the jurisdictional conclusion. Thus
assuming facts A, B, and C to be true, are they sufficient to constitute the
3 z8 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (1873).
34 No attempt is made here to determine which jurisdictions retain this rule, because of the
great confusion existing among the cases and the irrelevancy of the problem to the present dis-
cussion. It is sufficient for this criticism that such a rule still exists. See: McKnight v. Wilson,
158 Ga. 153, 122 S.E. 702 (1924); Smolinsky v. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co., 126 Kan. 5o6, 268
Pac. 830 (1928); United Drug Co. v. Cordley & Hayes, 239 Mass. 334, 132 N.E. 56 (1921);
Clabaugh v. Wayne Circuit judge, 228 Mich. 207, 199 N.W. 710 (1924); Jongewaard v.
Gesquire, 51 N.D. 173, 199 N.W. 585 (1924); McIntosh v. Holtgrave, 79 Okla. 53, 191 Pac. 739
(1920); F. P. Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal and Coke Co., 267 Pa. i8o, iio At. 79 (1920);
Turks Head Tailoring Co. v. Anthony, 38 R.I. 7, 94 At. 857 (191s).
3 232 U.S. 236 (1914).
36 See: Continental Supply Co. v. Whan, iii Kan. 687, 208 Pac. 563 (1922); Smolinsky v.
Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co., 126 Kan. 5o6, 268 Pac. 830 (1928); Price v. Schaeffer, 16i Pa.
St. 530, 29 Atl. 279 (1894); Sutherland v. Peoples Bank, iii Va. 515, 69 S.E. 341 (19o).
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basis upon which the court assumed jurisdiction and further, does that
basis justify the assumption of jurisdiction? The other element of due
process is the sufficiency of the notice.37 In the Mildrich case it should be
noted that the parties were both residents of Indiana. The court says:
"Without the necessity of deciding more in the present case, it is enough to say that
the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, made under the circumstances detailed did
not in our opinion deprive the plaintiff in error of due process of law within the meaning
of the i4th Amendment."'' 8 (italics supplied.)
This fact is of particular significance for it furnished a jurisdictional
basis necessary to due process. It is not apparent in the Miedrich case
whether the opinion was directed at the jurisdictional or the notice ele-
ment of due process but it is not difficult to agree with the court that
"under the circumstances," including the residence of both parties in In-
diana, the due process clause was not violated. Domicil is one of the rec-
ognized grounds for jurisdiction. 39
Since jurisdiction in the sense of due process exists, that is, since the
facts of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional basis and conclusion are correct,
the only remaining question is that of the jurisdictional authorization. In
the Miedrich case there can be no doubt as to the authorization since it
was approved by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
It has previously been contended that when such a judgment rendered
upon a false return, is sued upon in another state the inquiry is shifted to
"under what circumstances, if any do the laws in force in the various
states make possible the rendering of a valid personal judgment without
personal service."14 It was suggested that if the state where the judgment
was rendered allows impeachment of the return, then the court where the
judgment is presented may allow impeachment, but if the former does not
then the latter must do the same.
It is suggested that the first inquiry is whether or not a valid basis for
jurisdiction exists. If the defendants were not domiciled within the state
and no other jurisdictional basis existed it would make no difference
whether the laws of the state rendering the judgment allowed an impeach-
ment of the return or not for in such case the jurisdictional conclusion or
the jurisdictional basis would be in error and the judgment lacking in those
37McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (io97); Skala v. Brockman, io9 Neb. 259, igo N.W.
86o (1922); Burdick, Service as a Requirement of Due Process in Actions in Personam, 20
Mich. L. Rev. 422 (1922).
38 232 U.S. 236, 247 (1914).
39 See cases cited in supra note rS.
40 See, The Conclusiveness of State Judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28
Yale L. J. 579 (1919).
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essentials inherent in due process. Therefore the first question is as to the
jurisdictional facts, the jurisdictional conclusion and the validity of the
jurisdictional basis. Then, if it is determined that these are present and
correct the inquiry is whether or not the laws of the state recognize such
a basis. If impeachment of the return is allowed then such a basis for ju-
risdiction is not recognized under such circumstances, even though it might
have been. If impeachment is not allowed according to the law of the
state, then the assumption of jurisdiction under such circumstances is
authorized. 41
Assuming that a jurisdictional basis exists other than actual personal
service, such as domicil of the parties, the only question is what effect does
the state where the judgment was rendered give to the judgment even as-
suming the return to be false. If that state refuses to recognize such a
judgment, i.e. considers the judgment as void if based on a false return,
then the domestic forum need not take cognizance of the judgment, still
assuming that the return is false. But if that state recognizes such a judg-
ment as valid, i.e. refuses to allow impeachment of the return, then the
domestic forum must under the Full Faith and Credit Clause do the same.
Such records are not void .and so must "have such faith and credit given to
them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from which they are taken.
' '42
On the other hand, if the only jurisdictional basis present is the personal
service recited in the record, that is, if the judgment would be void as
wanting in due process if the recited personal service were false, then the
law of the state rendering the judgment with respect to impeachment of
the return is immaterial. As was stated in the case of Cooper v. Newell:43
"As any provisions by statute for the rendition of judgment against a person not a
citizen or resident of a state, and not served with process or voluntarily appearing to an
action against him therein, would not be according to the course of the common law, it
must follow that he would beentitled to show that he was not such citizen or resident,
and had not been served or appeared by himself or attorney."44
4t As previously pointed out no attempt is made here to determine the law of the various
states on this point, but the only indication which has come to the author's attention which in-
dicates that perhaps the sheriff's return is not conclusive on collateral attack is the case of
Unangst v. Southwick, 8o Neb. 112, 113 N.W. 989 (i9o7), 8o Neb. iig, ix6 N.W. 864 (19o8)-
See also: McIntosh v. Holtgrave, 79 Okla. 63, 191 Pac. 739 (1920). As to whether in a suit on a
foreign judgment the attack is direct or collateral see Kingsborough v. Tousley, 56 Ohio St.
450, 47 N.E. 541 (1897).
42 I Stat. 122 (1790), 28 U.S.C.A. § 687 (1928).
43 Y73 U.S. 555 (1899).
44 173 U.S. 555, 569 (I899).
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Thus, the criticism previously referred to 45 is in a large measure justi-
fied. Particularly the following statement and holding in the case of
Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Smith46 is subject to criticism:
"When a judgment sued on here is not a domestic judgment and is one rendered in
another state or jurisdiction the defendant may plead and prove that he was not duly
served with process and did not authorize an appearance in the action in which judg-
ment was entered."47
The objection is not especially along the lines suggested in the note re-
ferred to 45 but because the statement does not consider that there might
be, and in this case appeared to be, since both parties were residents of
Illinois, any valid grounds for assuming jurisdiction other than personal
service or appearance. Thus the statement would be correct if there were
no other grounds for assuming jurisdiction present in the case. In the case
of Wood v. Augustins49 the court more nearly covered the subject when it
stated:
"We think the judgment in question could be collaterally attacked by evidence
showing the court had no jurisdiction and the court should have received the evidence
offered by the defendant for the purpose of showing that process was not served on
him, that he was not an inhabitant of the state of Maine, that the person upon whom
the officer certified he served the process was another person that he made no appear-
ance, etc. etc."5 °
Here was evidently an attempt to include every possible basis of juris-
diction and if it were shown that none existed the judgment would be
void, but in the Smith case, even though it were conceded that the de-
fendant "was not duly served with process and did not authorize an ap-
pearance" jurisdiction might still exist since both parties were residents
of Illinois.
4s In the note previously cited, 28 Yale L. J. 579 (i919), it is said by way of reasons why a
court may lack power to render a judgment
...... because although these facts do exist (jurisdiction over this class of defendants)
there has been no compliance with the rules of law in force in the particular State in question,
which govern the acquisition by the Court of 'jurisdiction' to alter the defendant's legal rela-
tions." It is here contended that if jurisdiction is assumed upon such a basis as will keep the
judgment from being void as wanting in due process, this question becomes merely one of the
"effect of the judgment according to the law or usage of the state where rendered."
It is perhaps significant that the author of the note referred to adds in a footnote that there may
be some distinction between a resident and a non-resident temporarily within the state who
was not a citizen of the state.
46 185 Mass. 363, 70 N.E. 426 (i9o4).
47 185 Mass. 363, 366, 7o N.E. 426 (19o4).
48 28 Yale L. J, 567 (1920).
49 70 Vt. 637, 4r Atl. 583 (1898).
so 70 Vt. 637, 641-642, 41 At. 583 (1898).
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In other words if there are enough elements in a given situation to give
the court jurisdiction without personal service there is a good due process
jurisdiction and the only question remaining is the effect of the judgment
in the state where rendered. If the judgment is not recognized there, be-
cause of the falsity of the return or for any other reason, the forum need
not recognize the judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause even
though the enforcement of that judgment would not be a denial of due
process. But, if the service is, from the point of view of due process, neces-
sary because of the absence of other sufficient jurisdictional elements then
irrespective of the jurisdictional authorization, or what the state law may
be, the falsity of the return may be shown.
THE EFFECT OF A CONTESTED ADIUDICATION-PRIOR TO
THE JUDGMENT
The concept of the jurisdictional authorization here suggested is more
fully illustrated in the case where the record discloses not merely a recital
of jurisdiction but indicates that there has been an adjudication of that
jurisdiction after a contested hearing at which both parties appeared and
were heard upon the jurisdictional question. The case of Chicago Life In-
surance Co. v. CherrysI is particularly in point and has been subject to a
great deal of misinterpretation.
In this case the plaintiff sued the defendant in Tennessee. In the Ten-
nessee court the defendant raised the question of jurisdiction over the per-
son and the matter was there litigated and found in favor of that jurisdic-
tion and judgment was rendered against the defendant who made no fur-
ther plea to the merits of the case. Thereupon the defendant carried the
case to the Supreme Court of Tennessee and the ruling in favor of juris-
diction was affirmed by that court.52 The plaintiff then brought suit upon
the judgment in the Illinois court and the defendant again raised the
question of the jurisdiction of the Tennessee court, contending the judg-
51 244 U.S. 25 (I917). Most of the material subsequently presented herein has been admi-
rably considered from a realistic point of view by Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Juris-
diction, 3i Col. L. Rev. 238 (i93i). In this article the author reached the conclusion, based up-
on the reasonableness, convenience and justice of the holdings, that "a defendant who appears
specially to contest jurisdiction in personam under circumstances which constitute due process
has so participated in the adjudication thus made as to give it the character and substance of a
judgment entitled to full faith and credit." The present discussion is not to be considered anti-
thetical to this conclusion but is merely an attempt to apply the existing legal theories of juris-
diction and to point out that no extension of our present jurisdictional concepts is necessary to
the solution of the problems involved.
s2 The Tennessee decision does not seem to have been reported. The statement of facts is
taken from the United States Supreme Court decision cited supra, note 44.
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ment was void because of the lack of such jurisdiction. The Illinois court
refused to go into the matter and held that the Tennessee judgment was
entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution. The case was ap-
pealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and was affirmed on the grounds
that the matter of jurisdiction, having been decided by the Tennessee
court, was res adjudicataj3 and that the Tennessee court's determination of
jurisdiction must be given full faith and credit. The defendant then
brought the case to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that
since the judgment was void, the action of the Illinois court amounted to
a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois
court, not on the grounds of res adjudicata but on the grounds that:
"If a statute should provide that filing a plea in abatement, or taking the question
to a higher court should have that effect, it could not be said to deny due process of law.
The defendant would be free to rely upon his defense by letting judgment go by de-
fault ..... Whenever a wrong judgment is entered against a defendant his property
is taken when it should not have been, but whatever the ground may be, if the mistake
is not so gross as to be impossible in a rational administration of justice, it is no more
than the imperfection of man, not a denial of constitutional rights."54
And after stating that the same could be true without a statute by such
a construction by the courts of the state, the court is of the opinion that:
"It can be no otherwise when a court so decides as to proceedings in another State.
It may be mistaken upon what to it is matter of fact, the law of the other State. But a
mere mistake of that kind is not a denial of due process of law."ss
It will be noted that the court found jurisdiction existed, not because
the Tennessee court had so adjudicated but because the defendant had
appeared and defended even though that defense went only to the ques-
tion of jurisdiction. This is in accord with the previous holdings of the
court, particularly in connection with the cases of York v. Texas 6 and
Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp.S7
53 i9o Ill. App. 70 (914). SS 244 U.S. 25, 30 (x917).
S4 244 U.S. 25, 30 (19M7). s6 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
57 235 U.S. 261 (i914). In this case the court states:
"The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liber-
ty, or property, without due process of law.' This prohibition has regard not to matters of
form, but to substance of right. Since its adoption, whatever was the rule before, a non-resident
party against whom a personal action is instituted in a state court without service of process
upon him may, if he please, ignore the proceeding as wholly ineffective, and set up its invalidity
if and when an attempt is made to take his property thereunder, or when he is sued upon it in
the same or another jurisdiction ..... But if he desires to raise the question of the validity of
the proceeding in the court in which it is instituted, so as to avoid even the semblance of ajudgment against him, it is within the power of the State to declare that he shall do this subject
to the risk of being obliged to submit to the jurisdiction of the court to bear and determine the
merits, if the objection raised to its jurisdiction over his person shall be overruled."
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In such a situation the fact of appearing and contesting the jurisdiction
is the jurisdictional fact; that such acts amount to a consent to jurisdiction
is the conclusion and, of course, consent is a proper legal theory upon
which jurisdiction may be based.
Consequently a state may prescribe that a voluntary special appear-
ance in one of its courts, even for the bare purpose of litigating the juris-
dictional question, shall be deemed a general appearance, without violat-
ing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As pointed
out by the Supreme Court, this may be done by a statutes' or merely by
such a construction by the courts of the state.
This constitutes the jurisdictional authorization.
Thus assuming59 that such was the law of Tennessee, jurisdiction was
properly assumed. Therefore the judgment could not be void and conse-
quently not subject to the defense of lack of due process but must be given
such faith and credit as it has by law or usage in Tennessee. But what if
the law of Tennessee was not that a special appearance subjected the de-
fendant to the jurisdiction of the court? Would this have made any differ-
ence? The Cherry case answers this question by holding in effect that such
a basis for jurisdiction exists in Tennessee as well as in every other state.
If a judgment is rendered after a contested adjudication of jurisdiction,
which, according to the law of the state where rendered, constitutes a
valid judgment even though predicated, perhaps erroneously, upon an-
other basis of jurisdiction, the enforcement of that judgment by another
state is not a denial of due process. Thus suppose the case had not been
passed upon by the Tennessee Supreme Court and the lower court had not
been specifically authorized by the law of Tetnessee to assume jurisdiction
in such a case. Under such circumstances could it be said that the action
of the Illinois court amounted to a denial of due process in enforcing the
Tennessee judgment? Obviously the answer is in the negative.
Due process jurisdiction and the authority to exercise that jurisdiction
are entirely different matters. If the former existed, the action of the
s8 In addition to the Texas statute upheld in the case of York v. Texas, 137 U.S. r5 (i89o), a
Kentucky statute provides that s special appearance by a corporation for the purpose of quash-
ing the service of summons operates as a general appearance and if the objection is sustained
the appearance may stand for trial at the succeeding term of court. See Texas Laws (i889-
i89o) 135, and Maysville etc. R. Co. v. Ball, 1o8 Ky. 241, 56 S.W. 188 (igoo). See also: Iowa
Code (1897), § 3541; Blondel v. Ohlman, 132 Iowa 257, io9 N.W. 8o6 (igo6); Miss. Code
(igo6), § 3946; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Swanson, 92 MAiss. 485, 46 So. 83 (i9o8).
59 This assumption is contrary to fact since Tennessee has not specifically authorized the
assumption of jurisdiction based upon the defendant's special appearance. See: Sherry v. Di-
vine, ii Heiske. (Tenn.) 722 (1872); Boon v. Rahl, 3 Heiske. (Tenn.) 12 (1870); Mark Twain
Lumber Co. v. Lieberman, io6 Tenn. 153, 6i S.W. 70 (19oo).
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Tennessee court in assuming jurisdiction could not be void even though it
might be in error as to its theory of jurisdiction or as to the authority to
exercise that jurisdiction. Similarly the action of the Illinois court in en-
forcing the judgment would not be a denial of due process even though the
Illinois court might be in error as to the authorizations made by the law of
Tennessee.
Here is a judgment which is valid according to the law of the state
where rendered. If the allegations of the defendant are to be taken as
true, as they might well be since it is held that those allegations are imma-
terial, no basis for jurisdiction exists except the fact that the defendant
appeared and contested the jurisdictional question. This jurisdictional
basis is not specifically authorized by the state rendering the judgment.
Yet the enforcement of that judgment is not a denial of due process. Does
it not follow then that such a basis for jurisdiction exists in the state even
though a court is not specifically authorized by the law of that state to
assume jurisdiction upon such a basis in the first instance?
As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court6" the question of
full faith and credit is another question and if the Illinois court had de-
cided that the law of Tennessee did not authorize the judgment and had
refused to recognize it, then the Supreme Court would have been called
upon to decide whether or not the Illinois court had violated that section
of the Constitution. In such a case it could not be contended that the
judgment was void and so not entitled to full faith and credit since an
underlying basis of jurisdiction exists. Consequently the only question
would be the effect of such a judgment according to the law or usage of
Tennessee.
There can be no question but that a judgment rendered after the de-
fendant has appeared and contested the jurisdiction is valid. Under the
facts of the Cherry case it would appear that since the judgment is con-
sidered a valid and existing obligation according to Tennessee law6' it
must under the full faith and credit clause be given the same effect in
Illinois. This it is submitted, is the significance of the question of jurisdic-
tional authorization. Thus there are two questions. First, is the judg-
ment valid as judged by the st indard of due process of law? And second,
if so what is its effect in the state where rendered? Not the effect of a
6Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917). At page 3o the court observes, "If
the Tennessee judgment had been declared void in Illinois this court might have been called
upon to decide whether it had been given due faith and credit."
61 It would seem that this would follow from the fact that the judgment was upheld by the
highest court of the State. Note here that the theory of the jurisdiction used by the Tennessee
court is immaterial.
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judgment based upon such a theory of jurisdiction but the actual effect of
this particular judgment in the state where rendered. It might well be
that if the law of Tennessee did not authorize such a judgment it would
not enforce it. On the other hand it might consider, perhaps erroneously,
this judgment valid on some other grounds, as was no doubt the case here
since the judgment was upheld by the highest court of that state. Or the
law of Tennessee might specifically authorize the judgment upon such a
jurisdictional basis. Whatever the status of the particular judgment ac-
cording to the law of the state where rendered, the courts of Illinois and
every other state are bound by the Constitution and the act of Congress to
give "said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated .... such
faith and credit .... as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state from which they are taken. '' 62 If the Illinois court decides incorrectly
on this point and enforces the judgment no problem is raised since there is
no denial of the judgment 63 and there is no lack of due process since the
fundamental basis for jurisdiction is there. On the other hand if the court
decides incorrectly as to the law of Tennessee with respect to this judg-
ment and refuses to enforce it, then that court is not conforming to that
section of the Constitution and the act of Congress previously quoted.64
The case of Hall v. Wilder Manufacturing Company6s presents practical-
ly the same problem as the case of Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry.16
The language of the court, while seemingly quite rational might be quoted
either in support of or antithetical to the concepts herein suggested. In
this case Bogert and Hopper, Incorporated, sued the Wilder Manufactur-
6 Stat. 122 (1790), 28 U.S.C.A. § 687 (1928).
63 In all of the cases which have come to the attention of the author the question of full
faith and credit has been raised by the party relying upon the judgment. The usual case fol-
lows somewhat the following sequence: The plaintiff secures a judgment against the defendant
in state A and sues the defendant in state B on that judgment. The court of state B refuses to
recognize the judgment and the plaintiff attacks the decision on the ground that the court vio-
lated Article 4 Section i of the Constitution. But suppose the court in stateB recognized the
judgment as valid. Could the defendant then urge that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
violated on the ground that according to the "law and usage" of state A the judgment, not
being authorized, would not be enforceable in state A even though state A could so enforce the
judgment without a violation of due process?
64 See supra notes i and 2.
65 316 Mo. 812, 293 S.W. 76o (1927). See also the case of Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245,
9 So. 265 (x8g9) where in a suit to recover an assessment ordered by the Virginia court in which
court jurisdiction had been attacked and sustained, the court holds that full faith and credit
must be given the Virginia decision. No reason is given, the court merely stating, "but the de-
crees are not void and we are bound to accord to them the same faith and credit they have
by law and usage in the courts of Virginia."
6 244 U.S. 25 (1917).
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ing Company in a New York court. The defendant appeared to raise the
question of jurisdiction of the court over its person and upon evidence
submitted by the parties upon that question, the court found in favor of
jurisdiction. As a result judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and the defendant did not appeal from this adverse ruling. The present
plaintiff, Hall, being the assignee of the judgment, brought suit on the
judgment in the Missouri court and the defendant sought to avoid the
judgment on the grounds that it was void since the New York court er-
roneously held it to be doing business within the state of New York. It
was admitted by the defendant that the doing of business within a state
was a valid ground for the court to assume jurisdiction. Thus there was
no objection to the jurisdictional conclusion of the court. Further, certain
facts as found by the court to exist were admitted. These were the juris-
dictional facts. In this case the attack was upon the New York court's
determination of what it conceived to be the jurisdictional basis.
The court, however, seems to overlook another jurisdictional fact, basis
and conclusion which was admitted by the parties:
"It is conceded that a special appearance of the defendant did not constitute a gen-
eral appearance to the action, nor confer jurisdiction over the person of the de-
fendant." 67
It may be true that a judgment predicated upon such a basis was not
authorized by the law of New York but it nevertheless does prevent the
judgment from being void from the due process point of view.
Later, however, the court argues:
"Having procured the New York court to exercise its power upon the question of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to enter into an authorized inquiry
as to such jurisdiction and directly determine that question before proceeding to judg-
ment upon the merits, the defendant submitted itself to that court for the determina-
tion of that question, taking the chance that an adverse ruling, unreversed and not
appealed from, would preclude inquiry into the same question when sued upon the
judgment in the court of another State. Upon that question and by that court the de-
fendant was given the benefit of 'due process' by the submission of the question upon
the evidence offered and a hearing thereon in due and orderly manner." 68
This would seem to indicate that the Missouri court was not concerned
with the actions and adjudications of the New York court, but rather was
determining jurisdiction for itself from the actions of the defendant and
consequently deciding, not that the New York court's jurisdiction was
based upon the doing business by the defendant as determined by that
67.3r6 Mo. 812, 820, 293 S.W. 379 (1927).
68 316 Mo. 812, 827, 293 S.W. 379 (1927).
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court but rather upon the fact that the defendant appeared and contested
the jurisdictional question.
Later in the opinion the court seems to go back to the concept that the
New York court determined jurisdiction and so the Missouri court is
bound thereby. The court specifically remarks that it believes the princi-
pal of res adjudicata to be applicable. It is submitted that such a principle
of res adjudicata has no place in the consideration of whether or not full
faith and credit should be given to a judgment of a sister state. A foreign
court's determination of a jurisdictional question can no more make juris-
dictional facts true when the determination is contested than when that
determination is a mere recital. However, there is this distinction be-
tween the two types of determination of jurisdictional facts: In the latter
case, i.e. recital, jurisdiction is based upon certain recited facts as found by
the foreign court while in the former case the jurisdiction is not dependent
upon the facts as found by the foreign court, but rather it is apparent
from the acts of the defendant in appearing and contesting the issue.
The res adjudicata theory might be said to have been properly used in
the case of Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn.6" In this case a judgment was
secured in the United States District Court of Missouri. The jurisdiction
was attacked, but the issue was determined in favor of that jurisdiction.
No further plea was made. Subsequently an action was brought upon this
judgment in the United States District Court of Iowa. The Iowa District
Court held that the matter of the jurisdiction of the District Court in
Missouri was conclusive. Here the Supreme Court of the United States
pointed out that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution was not
involved, since neither of the courts concerned was a state court.70 In an-
swer to the question of a violation of due process the court stated:
69 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
70 Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn. supra note 69, 524. On the relation between the Federal
Courts and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution see: Embry v. Palmer, o7
U.S. 3, 9 (1882) (judgment rendered in U.S. Dist. CL brought to a State Court in Conn.; held
Full Faith and Credit Clause applied); Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 64o
(igoo), (U.S. District Court of Kansas judgment in a State Court of R.I.); Pennoyer v. Neff
95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877) (State Court judgment in a Federal Court); Cooper v. Newell, 173
U.S. 555 (1899) (State Court judgment in a Federal Court). In Knights of Pythias v. Meyer,
265 U.S. 30 (1924), it was said, "While the judicial proceedings of the Federal Courts are not
within the terms of the Constitutional provision (Art IV. § x), such proceedings, nevertheless,
must be accorded the same full faith and credit by state courts as would be required in respect
of the judicial proceedings of another State." In Cooper v. Newell, 173 U.S. 555 (1899), the
court is of the opinion:
"The courts of the United States are bound to give to the judgment of the State Courts the
same faith and credit that the courts of one State are bound to give to the judgments of the
courts of her sister States."
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"But there is involved in that doctrine no right to litigate the same question twice.
.... Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have con-
tested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried
shall be considered forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this
doctrine should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his
case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter
concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he submitted his cause."71
The holding in this case is not inconsistent with the language previously
quoted in the case of Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry72 nor is it in con-
flict with the present criticism of the use of the res adjudicata theory in the
Wilder Manufacturing Company case. In the Baldwin case the judgment
could not have been enforced if jurisdiction had not existed because of due
process, but if jurisdiction did exist, whether or not the judgment should
be recognized is merely a question of the law of the Federal Courts, since
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution has no application.
Consequently, this case merely approves a rule of procedure similar to
that which, as has been pointed out, obtains in other situations, namely
that when one appears and contests the jurisdiction of the court before
judgment on the merits there can be no objection on the grounds of lack
of due process when an attempt is made to enforce that judgment if the
court decided in favor of jurisdiction. Therefore, since jurisdiction did ex-
ist the question is merely one of Federal law as to whether or not the judg-
ment should be recognized. In this case the Supreme Court decided that
under the res adjudicata doctrine the Federal law should be that the de-
fendant should not be allowed to re-litigate the same questions. It is ap-
parent that this reasoning is different from the res adjudicata theory used
in Hall v. Wilder Manufacturing Company.7 3 There the court seems to con-
sider that the question of jurisdiction was res adjudicata since the Full
Faith and Credit Clause required the domestic forum to accept the pre-
vious determination of jurisdiction and therefore the court was bound un-
der the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce the judgment.
Such arguments as res adjudicata and attempts to determine the cor-
rectness of the foreign court's determination of the contested issue of juris-
diction merely confuse the issue. Appearing and contesting the jurisdic-
tion involves fundamentally a submission to jurisdiction and has a juris-
dictional value as such. If this fact exists it is not of prime importance
whether the foreign court rests its conclusion of jurisdiction upon that
ground or upon some other. The jurisdiction is in fact there. The validity
71 283 U.S. 522, 524, 525-526 (I93i).
72 244 U.S. 25 (1917). 73 316 Mo. 812, 293 S.W. 760 (1927).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
of the judgment does not depend upon the jurisdictional authorization.
The fact that the law of the foreign state does not authorize a judgment
based solely upon an appearance to contest the jurisdiction is immaterial
to the validity of a judgment when such a basis does in fact exist.
THE EFFECT OF A CONTESTED ADJUDICATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE
JUDGMENT
The case of Simmons Co. v. Sloan74 presents a different aspect of the
effect of an adjudication with respect to jurisdiction. In this case Sim-
mons Co. sued Grange and Sloan as partners in a New York court. Grange
only was served and judgment was rendered against him. Subsequently
upon application of a firm of lawyers the judgment was opened and an
answer filed for both Grange and Sloan and judgment was rendered
against both. Later Sloan by special appearance sought to have the judg-
ment set aside on grounds that at the commencement of the suit he was
not a resident, had not been served, was not a partner and had not author-
ized any attorney to represent him. The court refused to set aside the
judgment and upon appeal to the Appellate Division the judgment was
affirmed. The action now is in a New Jersey court upon the judgment.
The New Jersey Court rendered a verdict against Sloan and an appeal was
taken upon the grounds that the New York judgment, being rendered
without jurisdiction was a nullity. This argument the appellate court re-
jected and affirmed the judgment of the lower court, saying:
"He had, therefore, litigated unsuccessfully these very questions in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, and we think the judgment of such court is conclusive and res ad-
judicata of such question in the courts of this state. Such is the holding in the United
States Supreme Court in Chicago Life Isurance Co. v. Cherry, by which, in matters of
this character, dealing with judicial transactions between states resting upon mandates
of the federal constitution, we are bound, and accordingly accept as the law of the
land."7s
It is submitted that the reasoning of the court in the Cherry case does
not carry the implication given to it by the New Jersey court in the above
case. Specifically the court in the Cherry case rather negatives the conclu-
sion reached by the New Jersey court in the Sloan case. In the former the
court states with reference to the holding of the Illinois Court that the
matter was res adjudicata:
"The ground upon which the present judgment was sustained by the Appellate
Court was that as the issue of jurisdiction over the parties was raised and adjudicated
after full hearing in the former case it could not be reopened in this suit. The matter
74 1o4 N.J.L. 612, 142 Atl. r. (1928).
7s io4 N.J.L. 612, 614-6x5 (1928).
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was thought to stand differently from a tacit assumption or mere declaration in the
record that the court had jurisdiction. A court that renders judgment against a de-
fendant thereby tacitly asserts, if it does not do so expressly, that it had jurisdiction
over that defendant. But it must be taken as established that a court cannot conclude
all persons interested by its mere assertion of its own power, even where its power de-
pends upon a fact and it finds the fact."76
This language of the Supreme Court certainly cannot be used to sustain
any holding that once a court decides upon a contested hearing that certain
jurisdictional facts exist, the decision is res adjudicata upon the existence
of those jurisdictional facts when that question is raised in the courts of
another state. In fact it would seem to indicate the exact opposite. That
is, a court cannot conclude jurisdictional facts so as to be binding upon all
other courts by merely making an adjudication with reference to those
particular jurisdictional facts, even if that adjudication is contested.
The facts of the Cherry case also are entirely distinct from trying the
case on the merits first and then later upholding the jurisdiction upon a
contested hearing as was apparently done in the Sloan case. In the former
case there exists a fundamental basis of jurisdiction. The court may cer-
tainly say that if you come into our courts for the purpose of determining
a jurisdictional question we shall consider that you have consented to our
determination of the merits if it should so happen that we decide in favor
of that jurisdiction. But it might be a different thing for a state to say
to a defendant that if you subsequently attack the jurisdiction of our
courts over your person we shall take it that you previously consented to
our determination of the merits of the case if it should happen that we de-
cide that you were previously subject to the jurisdiction of the court. It
might seem that either the court had jurisdiction over the defendant to
decide upon the merits of the case at the time the decision was made or it
did not. It is perhaps difficult to see how a subsequent determination of
that jurisdiction can affect its actual existence. Can a court render a valid
judgment without jurisdiction and subsequently have that jurisdiction
supplied by some act of the defendant? If so, then it is possible that the
defendant's subsequent special appearance but not the court's determina-
tion of jurisdiction might supply that jurisdiction necessary to keep the
judgment from being void. It is not necessary at this point to decide this
question.
In the case of Howard v. Smith77 the New York court upon practically
identical facts as in the Sloan case reached a contrary decision. This ac-
7 244 U.S. 25, 29 (1917).
77 3 Jones & S. (N.Y.) 131 (1872).
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tion was a suit in the New York court upon a California judgment. There
had been no special appearance in the California court before the judg-
ment was rendered but after the judgment had been entered the defendant
appeared specially and sought to be relieved of the judgment upon the
grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over him and that the person
who previously had appeared for him was unauthorized. This application
was denied. In the suit upon the California judgment the New York court
held that the defendant should be allowed to show that the California
court did not have jurisdiction in spite of its adjudication. The grounds
for this holding was that it would be oppressive and unjust to hold that,
although the appearance was unauthorized the defendant was bound by
the judgment until he could get it opened in the court where it was ren-
dered and that if it were a nullity it was sufficient for him to show it to be
so when it was attempted to be enforced. The court was of the opinion
that the denial of the motion to set aside the judgment did not make the
question res adjudicata.
As previously pointed out, when it is admitted that the defendant ap-
peared and contested the point of jurisdiction before the judgment was
rendered this question of res adjudicaa is entirely irrelevant since certain
primary jurisdictional facts are admitted to exist, which, as decided by the
United States Supreme Court, do as a matter of law constitute a valid
jurisdictional basis. 78 That is, even a special appearance may as a matter
of law act as a consent to the jurisdiction of the court's subsequent de-
termination of the case upon its merits. Consent may form a perfectly
valid ground for so assuming jurisdiction. When that appearance comes
subsequent to the rendition of the judgment, however, the same jurisdic-
tional facts do not exist, though it may be that the jurisdictional basis and
jurisdictional conclusions are the same. Nevertheless unless this theory of
res adjudicata can furnish other jurisdictional facts and conclusions it can-
not be said that jurisdiction exists because of the adjudications of the for-
eign court.
It is at once apparent that the mere deciding of these questions by the
foreign court can have no bearing upon its previous power to render a
judgment on the merits any more than the deciding of these questions be-
fore judgment can give the court jurisdiction. Jurisdiction exists in both
cases, if at all, because of the action of the defendant in appearing and
contesting the jurisdiction and not because the foreign court determined
that jurisdiction did exist.
78 York v. Texas, 137 U.S. IS (i8go); Kaufman v. Wooters, 138 U.S. 285 (1891); Western
Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (I914).
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It must be remembered that certain facts are admitted to be true and
these facts are not only those considered by the foreign court but any
others that may appear from the record or be shown to exist. The only
question is whether any or all of these facts do as a matter of law consti-
tute a basis upon which as a matter of law the court might have assumed
jurisdiction. If the foreign court erroneously determines those matters of
law in favor of jurisdiction is there any principle of public policy involved
which prevents another court from refusing to recognize or requires the
recognition of the resulting judgment? The jurisdiction of the court can-
not be based upon the principles applied by that court since they are
erroneous. Since jurisdiction is not to be determined by the law of the
foreign court but rather by the law of due process, the judgment cannot
be sustained upon the ground that the foreign court determined jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, if the mere raising of the jurisdictional point after the
judgment does not amount to such consent as to render the court's prior
acts valid, the conclusion must be that the judgment is void and there is
nothing in the principles of res adjudicata which favors the recognition of
a void judgment.
The present criticism is not directed at the decision in either the case
of Simmons v. Sloan79 or that of Howard v. Smith,8° but rather at the
erroneous reasoning upon which both decisions are based. However, it
may be noted that a general appearance after judgment, just as before
judgment, corrects all defects in the court's jurisdiction over the person."
And while it is generally held that a special appearance after judgment,
just as before judgment, does not validate a judgment void for want of
jurisdiction,12 the contrary has been held. 3 From this it would seem that
according to the theory of Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 4 the deci-
sion in the case of Simmons v. Sloan,5 is correct since the principles in-
volved appear to be the same whether the jurisdictional question is liti-
gated before or after judgment. -
79 io4 N.J.L. 612, 142 At. i (1928). so 3 Jones & S. (N.Y.) I3i (1872).
81 See: Thompson v. Alford, 135 Cal. 52, 66 Pac. 983 (I9oi); Aherne v. WaKeeney Land
etc. Co., 82 Kan. 435, roS Pac. 842 (igro); Tootle-Weakley Millinery Co. v. Billingsley, 74
Neb. 531, io5 N.W. 85 (z9o5); Tisdale v. Rider, rig App. Div. 594, IO4 N.Y.S. 77 (1907);
Wickham v. South Shore Lumber Co., 89 Wis. 23, 61 N.W. 287 (1894).
82 See: Gray v. Hawes, 8 Cal. 562 (1857); Abrams v. Fine, 28 Misc. 533, 59 N.Y.S. 550
(I899); Jacobs v. Atlas Constr. Co., ri9 N.Y.S. 168 (I909).
s3 See: H.L. Griffin Co. v. Howell, 38 Utah 357, 113 Pac. 326 (1911), indicating that such an
appearance makes the judgment binding unless appealed from after a decision refusing to va-
cate the judgment.
84 244 U.S. 25 (1917). 85 104 N.J.L. 612, 142 Ad. 15 (1928).
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The whole question can be determined by a demurrer to the allegation
that the foreign court's determination of jurisdiction was in error. Ad-
mitting that the determination was erroneous and jurisdiction could not
be based upon the theory used by the foreign court the question still re-
mains whether or not jurisdiction did exist, not because of, but in spite of
that determination. If the defendant appeared and contested the jurisdic-
tion then the resulting judgment is not void and the defendant's conten-
tion that the foreign court erroneously determined jurisdiction is imma-
terial.
Most of the cases seem to consider that there can be only one basis for
jurisdiction and that the recital of that basis is the finding sought to be
contradicted. Thus in the case of contradiction of the sheriff's return the
cases seem to go on the assumption that if the return is false there was no
personal service and the judgment void. So also in the case of a foreign
corporation. If the corporation were not doing business in the state, it is
thought that the judgment is void regardless of other considerations. It
is suggested that this reasoning is fallacious since there may be, and in
most of the cases here considered there are, other grounds upon which
jurisdiction might rest. Any allegation that there was no personal service
or that the defendant foreign corporation was not doing business in the
state where the judgment was rendered would be irrelevant when it is ap-
parent from the record that jurisdiction might properly rest on other
grounds even though the foreign court erroneously thought it could as-
sume jurisdiction upon the basis of the type of service or the extent of do-
ing business or some other jurisdictional basis and apparently acted upon
that basis rather than upon any other grounds which might also exist.
But when the judgment is presented in another state the inquiry is not
necessarily whether or not the foreign court was correct in its theory of
jurisdiction but rather whether its assumption of jurisdiction can be sus-
tained upon any grounds.
In the case of recital or adjudication concerning the jurisdictional facts,
the burden is naturally upon the one denying those facts and here the
question arises as to how far must he go in negativing jurisdiction.86 The
answer is that the jurisdictional facts necessary to jurisdiction must be
overcome. Further than that it would seem not necessary for him to go.
The important point here emphasized is that all facts contained in the
record upon which jurisdiction could be based must be contradicted and
1 On the general question of presumptions in this connection see: Galpin v. Page, i8 Wall.
(U.S.) 350 (1873). Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U.S. 444 (1878); Green v. Equitable Mut. Life
and Endowment Assn., io5 Ia. 628, 75 N.W. 635 (1898); Marshall v. R. M. Owen & Co., 171
Mich. 232, 137 N.W. 204 (1912).
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not merely those which the foreign court considered to be pertinent to the
theory of jurisdiction considered by that court. Thus if it appears from
the record that the defendant by any act or circumstance was subject to
the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign court and that jurisdiction was
exercised, the judgment is not void regardless of what theory was used by
the foreign court but is entitled to have "such faith and credit given to it
in every court within the United States as it has by law or usage in the
courts of the state from which it is taken,"8 7 unless every such recital of
such acts or circumstances upon which jurisdiction might be based is re-
futed.
If in a given case there are enough elements to give the foreign court
jurisdiction irrespective of the particular basis considered by that court
and the authorization of the state law, there is good due process jurisdic-
tion and the judgment is entitled to be given the same effect in the domes-
tic forum as it has in the foreign state.
On the other hand if the only possible basis for jurisdiction is that con-
sidered or recited by the foreign court then the correctness of that decision
or recital not only may but must be inquired into. Again the question of
whether or not the foreign court was authorized by the state law to render
such a judgment is immaterial except insofar as it relates to the effect of
that judgment in the jurisdiction where rendered.
From this it will readily be seen that the solution of the problems pre-
sented involves the proper application of existing principles of jurisdiction
rather than any extension of those principles or any addition thereto.
37 I Stat. 122 (790), 28 U.S.C.A. § 687 (1928).
